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Whither the Web?
International Law, Cjbersecurity, and Critical
Infrastructure Protection
David P. Fidler
In November 2014, Admiral Michael Rogers, Commander

David P. Fidler is

of U.S. Cyber Command and Director of the National

the James Louis Calama-

Security Agency (NSA), highlighted how extensively criti-

ras Professor

cal infrastructure protection (CIP) and cybersecurity are

rer

intertwined. In congressional testimony, Rogers observed

an Adjunct

that a number of states and non-state actors can shut
down U.S.

critical infrastructure through cyber means,
with more nations seeking this capability. "I fully expect
that during my time as the commander," Rogers asserted,
we are going to be tasked to help defend critical infrastructure within the United

States because it is under

attack by some foreign nation or some individual or
group."' "We have got to develop," Rogers argued, "a set of
3
norms or principles for behaviors in this space."
Rogers' call for norms to counter cyber threats to critical
infrastructure challenges the adequacy of existing norms,
including those in international law. This challenge is
serious because where cybersecurity and CIP converge is
not devoid of international law. In fact, a web of norms
based in international law applies to cyber threats to criti-

[8]

Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

of Law at

Indiana University MauSchool of Law and
Senior

Fel-

low for Cybersecurity at
the Council on Foreign
Relations.

His

recent

publications include The
Snowden Reader (Indiana
University Press, 2o15).
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cal infrastructure. This web includes

States should be able to protect its crit-

not only legacy rules developed before

ical infrastructure from physical and

cybersecurity and CIP became prom-

cyber attacks by 2003.* Subsequently,
critical infrastructure's reliance on the

inent

problems

but

also

interna-

tional law crafted with CIP in mind.
As Rogers' testimony suggests,

Internet deepened

to the point,

as

the

Admiral Rogers testified, that cyber-

effectiveness of this web of norms is in

dependent control systems "are foun-

doubt, and for good reasons. However,
the desire to create new norms to

dational to almost every

address cyber threats to critical infra-

our power to our financial segment to

structure confronts serious problems.

the aviation industry[.]"'

The prospects for states agreeing to

U.S.

new norms are limited. Further, calls

cybersecurity has become an important

for new norms have to explain how new

and difficult CIP issue. The Stuxnet

principles

operation against Iran 6 and Snowden's

differ from existing ones

networked

aspect of our life, from our water to

experiences

underscore

why

7

and will escape the ineffective fate of

disclosures

established rules. These norm-relat-

revealed

ed problems help explain why U.S.

penetrate, monitor, manipulate,

policy is showing increasing interest

damage foreign cyber-connected criti-

in developing

exercising cyber

cal infrastructure. However, the United

power to deter foreign cyber activi-

States has failed to protect its cyber-

ties directed at critical infrastructure.

dependent

and

about

capabilities

NSA

that the United

critical

States can
and

infrastructure. 8

[The United States'] disequilibrium between offensive
and defensive cyber capabilities is a

dilemma for

critical infrastructure protection around
the world.

This disequilibrium between offensive

Critical
Infrastructure's
Cybersecurity Problem and
International Law. Protecting
critical infrastructure

gained promi-

nence in the 1990s in response to terrorism and increasing linkages between
critical infrastructure and cyber technologies. In 1998, President Clinton
established the goal that the United

and defensive cyber capabilities is a
dilemma for CIP around the world.
Although

CIP

should

policymakers
include

recognize

international

cooperation, 9 international law has not
featured prominently in policy discussions. First, much of a country's
critical infrastructure is located within
its territory (e.g., municipal water systems), and governments can protect it
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without international law. In addition,
damage to a nation's critical infra-

cyber crime. For cyber threats involving terrorism,

espionage,

or armed

structure does not always have cross-

conflict, states rely on pre-cyber inter-

border effects, lessening incentives for

national law. Whether this pre-cyber

governments to worry about CIP in

law applies effectively to cybersecurity

other countries. The most closely relat-

problems is controversial. As analyzed

International law outlaws all but one of the cyber
threats to critical infrastructure that

policymakers heartburn.

g iVe

ed international law addresses sectors

below, these legacy rules are impor-

considered critical infrastructure, such

tant for international law's

as air transport, but this law did not

protecting

emerge under the rubric of CIP.o

from cyber threats,

Second, the Internet's global dissemination

occurred

without

critical

role in

infrastructure
but these rules

were not developed to strengthen CIP.

states

The lack of international law for

crafting international law to regulate

CIP, Internet governance, and cyber-

this process. The spread of previous

security might suggest norms are miss-

communication technologies prompt-

ing concerning cyber threats to critical

ed creation of international law and

infrastructure. However, international

institutions." The Internet's

differ-

law is not a normative vacuum for CIP.

ent history became clear in contro-

Indeed, international law outlaws all

versies over Internet governance, with

but one of the cyber threats to critical

defenders

infrastructure

of the

multi-stakeholder

that give policymakers

model, which operates without need-

heartburn. In addition, states are start-

ing or generating

international law,
battling advocates of bringing Internet

ing to use international law to improve

governance

within

formal

cyber defenses for critical infrastruc-

interna-

ture. To borrow Admiral Rogers' lan-

tional law and organizations." When

guage, international law contains a "set

the

infrastructure

of norms or principles for behaviors

there was no

in this space." However, anxiety about

Internet- critical

relationship deepened,
Internet- specific
on which

CIP

law

cyber threats to critical infrastructure

objectives.

reveals a lack of confidence in this inter-

Third, cybersecurity's emergence as

national law. Understanding this prob-

a policy concern has not generated

lem requires probing existing inter-

much international

States have

national law, exploring how states are

adopted specific international law for

adapting such law to the CIP challenge,

[io]

to

international

graft

law.
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and analyzing calls

Legacy

Rules

for new norms.

and

Cyber

Crime Treaties: Existing
International
Law
and

Cyber Threats to Critical
Infrastructure.

Cyber threats to

not include crimes specific to critical infrastructure, their offenses apply
to using unauthorized access to computers operating critical infrastructure
to steal information, disrupt operations, extort money,

or cause dam-

age. In cases involving states not party
to cyber crime treaties, governments

critical infrastructure arise from crim-

can use general-purpose

inals, terrorists,

agreements and mutual legal assistance

and the intelligence

agencies and militaries of states. With

treaties

one exception, international law makes

crime involving critical infrastructure.

cyber activities by state or non-state
actors

that undermine

CIP illegal.

(MLATs)

Terrorist

efforts

to

extradition

address
to

cyber

access,

rupt, or damage computers

dis-

operat-

Most of the relevant norms come from

ing critical infrastructure would

pre-cyber

international

law,

fall

which

within the international law on cyber

are applied to cybersecurity problems.

crime. In addition, the International

Many constitute

Convention

fundamental prin-

for

ciples, including the prohibitions on

of Terrorist

intervention, use of force, and attacks

Bombings

the

Bombings

Suppression
(Terrorist

Convention),'5

which
6

on civilian targets in armed conflict.

168 countries have ratified,

The exception is espionage because

interpreted

can be

international law does not prohibit or

attacks against critical infrastructure.

regulate it.

It requires parties to criminalize acts

to cover terrorist cyber

undertaken with the intent to cause

International Law, Critical

death, serious bodily injury, or exten-

Infrastructure Protection,
and Cyber Threats from NonState Actors. States have developed

sive property destruction to an "infra-

international law for cyber crime. The

ry or substantial material damage."

leading treaty, the Council of Europe's
Convention
Convention),

on

Cybercrime

harmonizes

(COE
national

laws and facilitates law enforcement
cooperation on cyber crimes.'3

The

African Union's Convention on Cyber
Security and Personal Data Protection
(AU Convention)

includes the same

objectives." Although these treaties do

structure facility" 7 through a weapon
or device "designed, or has the capability, to cause death, serious bodily inju8

These provisions can encompass malicious software targeting critical infrastructure. States adopted this treaty in
1997 when concerns about terrorism

against critical infrastructure became
prominent,

including worries

about

cyber vulnerabilities. In short, international law contains a widely accepted
norm against terrorism perpetrated

International Engagement on Cyber V [II]
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against critical infrastructure through

civilian damage. These rules would not

various

apply if the critical infrastructure was a

means,

including

cyber.

legitimate military target (e.g., a "dual-

Cyber Threats to Critical

use" target) or the cyber operations did

Infrastructure from Military
and Intelligence Activities.

not constitute "attacks" under the law

National security officials worry that
foreign governments pose cyber threats
to critical infrastructure. RecallAdmiral
Rogers' prediction that, during his time
in office,

U.S. Cyber Command and

NSA will have to respond to a serious
cyber attack on U.S. critical infrastructure, potentially launched by a foreign
country. In this context, international
law has many norms, whether such an
attack occurs in peace or war. During
peacetime,

international law prohib-

its the use of force by states," and the
attack Rogers fears might violate this
rule. Even if the attack did not constitute an illegal use of force, it would
violate the obligations to settle disputes
peacefully and not to intervene in the
domestic affairs of another state.2 o To
avoid violating these norms, the foreign
country would need to justify its cyber
attack, perhaps arguing that it was using
force in self-defense in response to an
armed attack by the United States."
During armed conflict, the laws of
war would apply to cyber attacks on critical infrastructure. Depending on the
circumstances, a cyber attack on civil-

of armed conflict, namely acts intended, or reasonably like to cause, injury, death, damage, or destruction.
In his testimony, Admiral Rogers
expressed concern that foreign governments are conducting cyber reconnaissance on U.S. critical infrastructure.
However,
prohibit

3

international law does not
foreign governments

from

spying on U.S. critical infrastructure.
This situation is not unusual because,
as noted above, international law does
not

seriously

Intelligence

regulate

agencies

espionage.'
have

exploit-

ed every new communications technology, and cyber technologies have
been

no different.

about Chinese

U.S.

complaints

cyber espionage have

not gained international legal traction,

even before Snowden revealed

U.S.

cyber

espionage

capabilities.

International law's permissiveness does
not mean spying is harmless. It can
create significant costs, disrupt national security strategies,

and destabilize

relations between nations.

However,
states have been unwilling to control espionage through international
law-an outlook cyber threats to critical infrastructure

have not changed.

ian critical infrastructure could violate
the prohibitions

on attacking civil-

ian targets, using indiscriminate means
and methods of attack, and engaging
in attacks that cause disproportionate

[12]
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and
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in Critical Infrastructure.The

cyber threats

web of norms also involves states using

important, states started to use exist-

international legal mechanisms

and

to

ing multilateral,

CIP became more
regional, and bilat-

instruments to strengthen cybersecu-

eral mechanisms to cooperate on this

rity within critical infrastructure in two

problem. These efforts typically have

ways. First, states work to strengthen

not produced

CIP

but have elevated cybersecurity threats

against cyber threats within exist-

new international

law

legal frameworks.

to critical infrastructure in established

These efforts, by and large, do not

processes and institutions. For exam-

produce new international law but use

ple, the UN's governmental group of

established processes to achieve better

experts analyzing international security

cyber defenses for critical infrastruc-

implications of information technolo-

ture. Second, countries create interna-

gies identified the need for increased

tional legal obligations to protect criti-

cooperation on cyber threats to criti-

cal infrastructure from cyber threats.

cal infrastructure."

These practices reveal emergence of an

OAS,

international norm on strengthening

Canada cooperation3 ' have undertak-

cyber defenses for critical infrastruc-

en activities on this issue. Generally,
these efforts seek to strengthen cyber

ing international

ture.
The practices also reveal a differ-

8

OECD,

defenses

for

9

ASEAN,2

EU,2 7

6

NATO, 3 o and U.S.-

critical

infrastructure,
information
sharing on

ent approach to CIP. The legacy rules

improve

and international law on cyber crime

threats and cybersecurity practices, and

discussed above slot a cyber threat into

facilitate assistance to other countries.

a

International

category

conflict)

(e.g.,

terrorism,

in order

armed

to identify what

organizations

oversee-

ing critical infrastructure sectors are

rules apply. By contrast, the approach

also

informing the cyber-defense norm is

International Atomic Energy Agency

an "all hazards"

(IAEA)32 and the International Civil

strategy to protect

addressing

cybersecurity.

The

Organization (ICAO)3 3 are

critical infrastructure from the range

Aviation

of cyber threats. This strategy does

increasing their members'

awareness

not focus on whether a cyber intru-

of, and efforts to protect against, cyber

sion constitutes crime or espionage,
but whether networks are protected

threats to nuclear energy and civil avia-

against infiltrations from any source.

The IAEA's and ICAO's efforts pro-

tion.
vide a model for other international

Strengthening
Critical
Infrastructure's
Cyber
Defenses Through Existing
Cooperative Mechanisms. As

organizations or regimes
for critical

responsible

infrastructure sectors to

increase CIP activities against cyber
threats.

To

the

extent not

already

underway, activities within other legal

International Engagement on Cyber V [131
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frameworks touching on critical infra-

Acts of Cyber Terrorism" that, among

structure, such as treaties on manag-

other things, addresses the threat of

ing shared watercourses or control of

terrorist cyber activities against criti-

industrial accidents,

cal infrastructure. Following the AU

the

"soft law"

can implement

norm of strengthen-

Convention,

parties

to

the

COE

ing cyber defenses for critical infra-

Convention could amend the trea-

structure, thus implementing it more

ty

widely where cyber-dependent critical

for cyber

infrastructure control systems operate.

to

require

additional

sanctions

crimes committed

critical infrastructure.

against

Reflecting

on

the Tallinn Manual on the International Law

Strengthening

Critical

Infrastructure's

Cyber

Defenses
Through
New
International Law. Some states
have gone beyond cooperation through
established mechanisms to adopt inter-

Applicable to

Cyber Warfare,

governments

and non-governmental experts could
collaborate

in clarifying how inter-

national law applies to cyber operations against critical infrastructure in
armed conflict and cyber threats against
critical infrastructure in peacetime.3 7

national legal obligations specific to
protecting critical infrastructure from
cyber threats. An EU directive requires

Problems with the Web of

EU members to designate "European

Norms.

Critical Infrastructure" in the energy

Problemswith legacy rules and cyber- crime treaties:

and transport sectors and mandate that

Although pre-cyber norms apply, many

operators have security plans cover-

did not function well before cyberse-

'

3

curity came along. The effectiveness of

Members of the Shanghai Cooperation

the prohibitions on intervention in the

Organization (SCO) agreed in a treaty
to cooperate on ensuring informa-

the use of force has long been contro-

tion security within critical infrastruc-

versial. Adding cyber to the mix has not

ing risks,

3

including

cyber threats.

domestic affairs of other states and on

The AU Convention requires

produced stability. For example, wheth-

parties to take cybersecurity actions to

er various cyber operations, including

tures.

The

Stuxnet, violated the use-of-force pro-

use of binding requirements distin-

hibition has been debated without con-

guishes this part of the web of norms

sensus arising. The possibilities cyber

from non-binding activities

technologies offer intelligence

protect

critical infrastructure. 3

under-

taken within existing legal frameworks.

agen-

cies and militaries increase incentives

national law to bolster cyber defenses

to keep certain legal waters muddied,
raising concerns about the effectiveness

for critical infrastructure in a number

of legacy rules in the cyber age.

States could craft more specific inter-

of ways. Governments could negotiate
a "Convention for the Suppression of

[14]
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In terms of espionage and armed
conflict,

the legacy

rules

apply in

FIDLER
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ways that make use of cyber technolo-

gal cyber acts to specific actors often

gies attractive. The Internet has been

proves

technically difficult,

a prob-

"God's gift to spies,"38 and, despite the

lem compounded by legal principles

problems associated with cyber espio-

for determining state responsibility or

nage, states generally have no appe-

imposing criminal sanctions on indi-

tite to restrict this practice through

viduals that set high evidentiary thresh-

international law. The United States

olds.

favors an international norm against

lem

economic espionage,3 ' but it has not

of legacy rules and treaties on cyber

been successful in advancing it-and

crime when applied to protect critical

Snowden's disclosures have made this

infrastructure from cyber threats.

objective harder. The law of armed
conflict applies in ways that make cyber

Thus,

the

attribution

prob-

often weakens the effectiveness

Finally,

in terms

of cyber-crime

threats to critical infrastructure, exist-

The possibilities cyber technologies offer intelligence
agencies and militaries increase incentives to keep

raising concerns
about the effectiveness of legacy rules in
the cyber age.
certain legal waters muddied,

weapons, operations, and attacks attractive politically, militarily, and ethically.

ing treaties are not, to date, widely
accepted. Only 46 countries have rati-

Being able to disrupt critical infra-

fied the COE Convention, despite the

structure deemed a "dual use" target

treaty being open for any state to join for

with cyber means, rather than destroying it with kinetic violence, offers capa-

over a decade. 4" The AU Convention,
adopted in June 2014, has not entered

bilities advanced militaries want. So,

into force, and only AU members can

rather than discouraging

ratify it. These facts mean many states

interest in

cyber, the laws of war heighten it.4 o
Many legacy rules and the law in

rely on extradition treaties and MLATs
to address cyber crime against critical

cyber-crime treaties also struggle with

infrastructure,

the attribution problem.

For exam-

have not proved sufficiently effective

ple, to apply the prohibition on the

against cyber crime for many reasons,
including the attribution problem."

use of force or criminal offenses in

but these instruments

anti-terrorism and cyber-crime treaties,

the rules require identification

of the perpetrator.

Attributing ille-

Problemswiththe"allhazards"cyber-defense norm:
Using international law to strengthen

International Engagement on Cyber V [I]
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cyber defenses in critical infrastruc-

no active-defense norm is likely-but

ture is not politically controversial, and

skepticism about cyber defenses is not

the "all hazards" approach avoids the

dissipating, as will be addressed below.

attribution problem. However, whether using existing international

legal

Problems

calls

with

for

new

norms:

mechanisms or creating new interna-

Admiral Rogers is not alone in want-

tional law can significantly improve

ing new norms. For years, the Obama

cyber defenses for critical infrastruc-

administration

ture is a harder question. Non-binding

for "norms of responsible behavior in

activities in various international orga-

cyberspace,"'

and, in 2015, the U.S.

nizations, such as IAFA and ICAO,
are too recent and uneven to invite

government

has advanced principles

either

In

tially to conflict prevention and stabil-

terms of new international law, the

ity in time of peace."4 6 U.S. technol-

AU Convention has no track record

ogy companies, such as Microsoft, have

because it is not in force. Whether the

developed ideas for norms.

enthusiasm

or cynicism.

it believes

emphasized the need

"can contribute

substan-

7

treaty has contributed to better

However,
these calls for new norms confront the

cybersecurity in critical infrastructure

damage Snowden did to the United

of SCO

States in international

SCO

members

is not apparent.
opin-

For example,

U.S.

cyber affairs.

arguments

that

ions differed on whether cybersecurity

cyber espionage targeting the private

had improved, its directive "encour-

sector (including operators of critical

aged policies for the protection

of

infrastructure)

.

The EU observed that, while

warfare" *8 have been,

national critical infrastructure

. .

constitutes

economic

in the post-

[and] resulted in concrete actions such
as the creation of specific national

Snowden period, dead on arrival inter-

3
bodies to deal with CIP policies."'

the desire for new norms is a lack of

More

substantively,

cyber-defense

norm

whether

the

contributes

enough to protecting critical

nationally.

Another problem with

clarity about what norms people have
in mind and how they differ from

infra-

what the existing web of norms con-

structure from cyber threats, especially
"advanced persistent threats" from states

tains. For example, the U.S.-proposed

or criminal organizations, is not clear.

ing or interfering with critical infra-

Concerns

structure

about cyber-defense

mea-

norms prohibiting a state from damagor

computer

emergency

sures have fed debates about the need

response capabilities in another state

for "active defense" strategies,

which

apply to actions that are illegal under

include, among other approaches, vic-

international law. 49 Pushing for cyber-

tims "hacking back" against suspect-

specific corollaries to existing rules is

ed perpetrators.

44

The controversies

surrounding active defense mean that

[16]
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not objectionable,

but the upside is

limited given that international

law
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already outlaws the behavior in ques-

Rogers argued that strategies focused

tion. However, some corollaries might

on cyber defenses are not protecting

re-open controversies in internation-

U.S. computer networks or deterring

al law. For example, trying to shield

foreign state and non-state actors from

national computer emergency response

infiltrating them. According to Rogers,

capabilities

the answer is to use offensive cyber capa-

from

cyber

operations

during armed conflict might highlight

bilities to increase deterrence. In early

disagreements about "dual use" tar-

April 2Q15, President Obama signed

gets, including friction related to posi-

an executive order authorizing sanc-

tions of countries, such as the United

tions on individuals outside the United

States, that define such targets broadly.

States who engage in malicious cyber

Finally, proposals

for new norms

activities that constitute a threat to U.S.

have to explain how they would fare

national security, foreign policy, eco-

better than the old ones. Advocacy for

nomic health, or financial stability."

cyber-specific corollaries

to existing

The executive order included within

general principles often fails to illu-

such threats cyber activities that harm

minate why state or non-state

actor

or compromise entities operating criti-

compliance would improve. Admiral

cal infrastructure. The executive order

Rogers expressed his concern that a

seeks to deter individuals, by threat of

foreign country or non-state

targeted sanctions,

group

from engaging in

will, in the near future, launch a major

malicious cyber activities against U.S.

cyber attack on U.S.

computer networks,

critical infra-

especially those

structure-an attack that would violate

used

international law. Why Rogers thinks

ture.5 2 In mid-April 2oi5, the U.S.

that foreign countries

Department of Defense released its new

groups-apparently

or non-state

willing

to

defy

to operate

cyber strategy,

3

critical infrastruc-

and news reports and

international law-would comply with,
or be deterred by, new norms is per-

experts noted the strategy's emphasis on

plexing. The answer to this riddle might

These developments reflect height-

be that norms are not, in fact, the

ened emphasis by the U.S. government

answer to the problem Rogers posited.

on deterrence achieved through offen-

'

offensive capabilities and deterrence. 5

sive cyber capabilities and operations

From Norms to Power: The

or financial and travel sanctions against

Dawn of Cyber Deterrence.

perpetrators. This shift is not incom-

In congressional testimony in March
2015, Admiral Rogers focused on the
need for the United States to develop,
threaten, and use offensive cyber capabilities to deter foreign cyber threats.5 0

patible with an interest in norms, but
it reflects less confidence that existing
or new norms will, for the foreseeable
future, improve cybersecurity for critical infrastructure. Instead, the United
States wants to deter cyber threats to

International Engagement on Cyber V [17]
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Heightened emphasis by the U.S.
government on deterrence ...reflcts

less confi-

dence that existing or new norms will, for the foreseeable future, improve cybersecurity for critical
infrastructure.
critical

infrastructure

by

exercising

es with deterrence,

especially in the

material power to threaten and, if nec-

nuclear context."5

essary, impose punishment. As Admiral

rence means, and how it affects the web

Rogers acknowledged, cyber deterrence

of norms relevant to protecting criti-

will not be like previous experienc-

cal infrastructure, is about to unfold.

[i8]
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